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Notes and Comments
A. Burton Bass*, Scientific Statistical
H. Davidson Gesser** and Methodology and The
K. Stephan Mount*** Doctrine of "Reasonable
Doubt" in Criminal Law; (With
Specific Reference to the
Breath Analysis for Blood
Alcohol) Empirical Fact
or Legal Ficton?
Lawyers pride themselves on being men of reason. After all, they
postulate, it is the "reasonable man" who is enshrined at the apex
of the Anglo-American legal system in the adjudication of civil
disputes; it is the legally trained mind that proves so finely honed a
tool in the area of problem solving in private practice; the rational
decisional process is the hallmark of the judicial mind. Where the
life or liberty of an individual is in contention this expert "sense" of
reason is brought one step further - the criminal law, with few
exceptions, will not countenance a mere "preponderance of
evidence" or "balance of probabilities" in the establishment of the
burden of proof; there must be a greater degree of certitude. This
latter goal is attained through the application of the doctrine of
"reasonable doubt".
The parameters with which we need be concerned, at least in the
context of the imprecise "social organism" that constitutes law, are
thus obvious. It is something less than absolute certainty. 1 The
necessary legal goal will have been attained once any arbiters in the
criminal decisional process have reached an abiding conviction to a
moral certainty as to the guilt of an accused person. 2 The posterior
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1. A negative type of definition was rendered in a recent American decision when
the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
does not mean finding it to an absolute certainty. Cosco v. State (1974), 521 P. (2d)
1345
2. Perhaps the best definition of reasonable doubt was that given by a Canadian
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parameter (absolute certainty), can be expressed very simply in the
terminology of mathematical probabilities. Absolute certainty must
be taken to mean (both to the mathematicians and mere lawyers) one
hundred percent probability. The problem arises in defining the
anterior parameters. An abiding conviction to a moral certainty,
expressed in terms of mathematical probability, is certainly
something less than one hundred percent. The question is, of
course, exactly how much less? At exactly what point in the
integrum do mathematical probability and legal "reason" coincide?
This conundrum has been dealt with rather extensively in the
past. It is interesting to note that as long ago as the second half of
the seventeenth century, Leibnitz, the famous scientist, applied an
elementary scale of mathematical scholastic proofs in endeavouring
to assess moral certitude in both criminal and civil legal
proceedings. 3 In recent times, Professors Finklestein and Fairley
were learned proponents of the utilization of scientific methodology
in certain instances in order to augment mere legal "intuition".
4
Tribe was their worthy protagonist who pointed out the obvious thin
ice. In that respect Professor Tribe could be likened to that sanguine
cynic (unknown to the authors of this article) who once observed
that: "Statistics are like a bikini - what they reveal are
interesting, but what they obscure can sometimes prove vital". The
main case in point was that of People v. Collins;5 The prime bone of
contention was the use of the Bayesian6 approach in a legal context.
judge, Mr. Justice Mathers, in the case ofR. v. Krafchenko (1914), 17 D.L.R. 244
at 262, where in in his direction to the jury in a murder case, he stated that the
prosecution would have satisfied the onus of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt once the jurors had attained "an abiding conviction to a
moral certainty" to the effect.
3. Leibnitz, G. W., Allgemeine Untersuchungen Ober Die Analyse Der Begriffe
Und Wahren Satze (1686)
4. See: (a) M.O. Finkelstein and W. B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence (1970), 83 Harv. L.R. 489; (b) L.H. Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process (1971), 84 Harv. L.R.
1329; (c) M.O. Finkelstein and W. B. Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by
Mathematics" (1971), 84 Harv. L.R. 1801; (d) L. H. Tribe, A Further Critique of
Mathematical Proof (1971), 84 Harv. L. R. 1810
5. (1968) 68 Cal. (2d) 319; 438 P.(2d) 33; 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Supreme Court of
California en banc)
6. See: J. Cornfield, The Bayesian Outlook and its Application, Biometrics
(December 1969) 617 at 617: "The Bayesian outlook can be summarized in a
single sentence: any inferential or decision process that does not follow from some
likelihood function and some set of priors has objectively verifiable deficiencies.
The application of this outlook is a largely extra-mathematical task, requiring the
selection of likelihoods and priors that are appropriate to given problem situations,
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In order to refresh your memories, People v. Collins dealt with a
case of assault and robbery. The prosecution's evidence as to
identification came from two sources. The victim, who had been
assaulted from behind, stated that she saw a young woman with
blond hair running down the alley which was the scene of the crime.
An independent witness stated that a Caucasian woman with a blond
ponytail ran out of the alley and left in a yellow automobile driven
by a Negro with a beard and moustache. Relying on these
descriptions the police arrested what they thought was the
appropriate inter-racial couple. At their trial the prosecution was
able to deduce, by means of an expert witness, statistical
"evidence" to the effect that the probability that they were not the
couple in question was something in the order of one in twelve
million. Thus the statistical inference of guilt was overwhelming;
and so the trial court ruled. The conviction was overruled on appeal,
the Supreme Court of California holding that the mathematical
formulations were subject to attack and should not have been
admitted in evidence.
Very few such instances of extreme probability are likely to be
encountered. Perhaps even rarer are cases of extreme diversity in
probability. One such example, a Swedish overtime parking case,
has been noted by Professor Tribe.7 8 There, a police officer had
ticketed a car parked in a one-hour zone after he noted that the tire
valves of the front and rear wheels at the curbside of the car were in
the same positions before and after a period in excess of one hour.
The driver's defence was that he had moved his car during the
material time and had returned to the same parking spot; where,
fortuitously, his tires came to rest in approximately the same
positions as before. The court noted that, assuming the front and
rear tires rotate independently of each other, the probability of such
an event happening would be 1 in 144. If we were to express this in
percentage terms, it would equate to 0.694%. This the court held
was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, the court further noted that if all four wheels on the car
with the determination of what is appropriate requiring . . . 'responsible and
independent thinkers applying their minds and imaginations to the detailed
interpretation of verifiable observations"'.
7. Supra, note 4 (b) at 1340.
8. This particular case, reported in Svenskjuristidining, 47 (1962) 17-32, was also
discussed by H. Zeisel and H. Kalven Jr. in an article entitled: Parking Tickets and
Missing Women: Statistics and the Law, in Statistics: A guide to the Unknown, ed.
J. M. Tanur (San Franscisco: Holden Day Inc., 1972) at 102-11.
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rotated independently of one another, then the probability of the
four valve stems coming to rest in the same positions as when the
car had been initially parked would be 1 in 20,736. In percentage
terms, this would be equivalent to 0.00482%. Such a probability
would be more than ample for conviction.
Although the above cases are interesting, they are so isolated in
nature that they apparently do little to lay down definitive guidelines
in the area with which we are concerned. However, they are of more
than academic interest, particularly if they are examined in terms of
positive probability. In Collins, the probability that the man and
woman arrested were the guilty parties is so overwhelming as to
almost equate to 100%. This holds true even if one were to grossly
discount some of the computations used by the prosecution's expert
witness. An infinitesimal deviation from 100% would not be
absolute certainty, but it would certainly be something very close to
it. Analyzing the Swedish parking case in the same manner, it is
readily ascertainable that the first probability referred to (1/144 or
0.694% works out to a 99.306% (100%-0.694%) probability that
the accused was guilty. In the event that the valves are noted for all
four tires which rotate independently, the probability is 1/20,736
(0.00482%) or 99.995% (100% - .0048%) that the accused was
guilty. Are the courts really capable of rendering that fine a
mathematical distinction between guilt and non-guilt - particularly
where the difference is a mere 2/3rd's of a percentage point? Is the
judicial sense of discernment really that much more perceptive than
the mathematician's? Where this problem can become of large
importance is in the area of the criminal law where the prosecution
relies quite heavily on the use of modem technical apparatus to
secure a conviction. The polygraph or lie detector, radar,
fingerprinting, "voiceprinters", Breathalyzers; these are only some
of the more obvious examples which come immediately to mind.
All of these scientific aids to contemporary law enforcement are
subject to some degree of error both in their operation and in the
interpretation of their results. 9 It is the Breathalyzer that is at present
probably the most extensively utilized scientific instrument in court
proceedings; indeed most jurisdictions have Breathalyzer evidence
uppermost in mind when enacting criminal legislation pertaining to
the offences of impaired and drunken driving. Therefore, it is with
9. This question has recently been discussed by David Patterson in What Can
Science do for the Law (1975), 15 The Forensic Science Society 3.
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the mathematical treatment of Breathalyzer evidence that this paper
will primarily deal.
The Breathalyzer can be described as a machine that renders
direct readings of the concentration of ethyl alcohol by volume in an
individual's bloodstream. 10 Chemically ethyl alcohol can be
oxidized to acetic acid. A vial containing a solution of potassium
dichromate in sulfuric acid in a fixed concentration is inserted into
the instrument. Prior to oxidation, potassium dichromate is
yellow-orange in color. As oxidation progresses the solution
gradually changes to green, the change in color being directly
proportional to the degree of oxidation. The suspect is asked to
breathe deeply into the mouthpiece of the instrument, thus emitting
alveolar" air which passes through the dichromate solution. A
"colorimeter" scans the solution photoelectrically, and, in the
event of any color change, a needle on the machine moves over a
dial marked off in calibrations equivalent to a direct percentage
reading of the volume amount of ethyl alcohol in the alveolar
breath.
We have sketched the physical makeup and the operation of the
Breathalyzer with a very broad brush. However, our description
should suffice to point out, even to the scientifically uninitiated, that
this instrument is certainly error prone. The exact degree of error
inherent in the operation of the Breathalyzer has recently been
reviewed by one researcher from both a scientific and legal
standpoint, and he concluded that the accuracy with which breath
alcohol levels can be determined is about ±10%.12 This is
equivalent to ±0.025% of alcohol in blood.
13
To a certain extent, law enforcement agencies tend to minimize
these error characteristics, as it is generally accepted that a blood
alcohol level as determined from breath measurement is about
0.005% (5 mg alcohol/100 ml blood) lower than that of
measurements obtained from chemically analyzing an actual venous
10. For a more detailed discussion see R. F. Brokenstein, The Evolution of
Modern Instruments for Breath Alcohol Analysis (1960), 5 Journal of Forensic
Sciences 395.
11. For the purposes of simplicity "alveolar" breath can be described as
"deep-lung" breath. For a more detailed description see (a) N. H. Spector, Alcohol
Breath Tests: Gross Errors in Current Methods of Measuring Alveolar Gas
Concentrations (1971), 172 Science 57; (b) K. M. Dubowski, Biological Aspects
of Breath-Alcohol Analysis (1974), 20/2 Clinical Chemistry, 294.
12. W. S. Lovell, Breath Tests for Determining Alcohol in the Blood (1972), 178
Science 264
13. Supra, note I1(a)
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blood sample. 14 15 In this respect it is certainly true that an accused
driver is given the benefit of some doubt in the given accuracy of
any breath measurement. What has not been widely publicized,
however, is the large variation that can exist amongst individuals in
regard to the relative values of alcohol per unit of volume in the
bloodstream and alcohol per unit of volume in the alveolar breath.
The accepted multiplicative factor in this regard is 2 100, that is: that
in any given individual the concentration of alcohol per unit of
volume of blood is accepted as' 6 2100 times that of the
concentration of alcohol per unit of volume of alveolar breath. All
measurements made with the Breathalyzer are based on this factor
of 2100, it is a scientific principle that emanates from what is known
as "Henry's Law". 1
7 18
To the knowledge of the authors, there has been to date no
serious attempt to analyse breath tests statistically for blood
alcohol levels of intoxicated drivers. This we shall now attempt
to do; commencing with a statistical treatment of the errors
inherent in any scientific measurement and concluding with
percentage probabilities of verifiable accuracy relating to the
various degrees of impairment and intoxication. We shall use as
our benchmark a rather typical criminal statute in this respect:
namely the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada,19
the ".08" type of legislation now familiar to many workers in
this field.
14. B. B. Coldwell and H. W. Smith, Alcohol Levels in Body Fluids After
Ingestion of Distilled Spirits (1959), 37 Can. J. Biochem. 43
15. Report on Impaired Driving Tests, ed. B. B. Coldwell, Queen's Printer,
Ottawa (1957)
16. (a) M. F. Mason and K. M. Dubowski, Alcohol, Traffic, and Chemical
Testing in the United States: A Resume and Some Remaining Problems
(1974), 20/2 Clinical Chemistry 126
(b) Proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Blood/Breath Alcohol ratio
(January, 1972), Indiana University Law School, Indianapolis, Indiana
17. Henry's Law states that at constant temperature the concentration of a gas
dissolved in a solvent is proportional to the pressure of that gas above the solution.
Thus the air in the lung picks up a fixed proportion of alcohol from the blood with
which it is equilibrated.
18. The variation between breath alcohol and blood alcohol levels will be
discussed later. See p. 359, Fig. 2 infra.
19. R.S.C. 1975, c. 93, s. 17 provides as follows: "236. (1) Every one who drives
a motor vehicle or has the care or control of a motor vehicle, whether it is in motion
or not, having consumed alcohol in such a quantity that the proportion thereof in his
blood exceeds 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, is guilty of an
indictable offence or an offence punishable on summary conviction and a liable
(a) for a first offence, to a fine of not more than two thousand dollars and not less
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Error Statistics
Every measurement has an error associated with it. By repeating
the measurement many times a distribution of the values can be
obtained from which an average value can be calculated. The
error associated with the average value can be assigned with a
degree of confidence determined by the spread in the distribution
of the original measured values. An example of the variations of
a measurement is in the determination of the velocity of light in
vacuum (Table 1).
TABLE 1
Velocity of light in vacuum*
















*R. T. Birge (1941), Rep. Progr. Phys. 8, 90
+E. R. Cohen (1974), Res/Div. 25, 32-26
The table shows how the value of a simple physical constant
determined over many years gradually increases in precision (the
error decreases) though the absolute value can change considera-
bly. A physiological constant (the (2100 factor) is more subject
to error and to a great variation from one individual to another.
than fifty dollars or to imprisonment for six months or to both;
(b) for a second offence, to imprisonment for not more than one year and not less
than fourteen days; and
(c) for each subsequent offence, to imprisonment for not more than two years and
not less than three months ....
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The error in a measurement is usually expressed by using the
sample standard deviation which is occasionally defined as the




where N is the sample size and di is defined as
di = xi - m (2)
with x, being the value of a single measurement and m the average
(or mean) of all the measurements in the sample, i.e.
Xj (3)
N
The sample standard deviation is usually defined2 l by
. ds (4)
N-I
For large samples N = N-I and little differences exists between
formulas (1) and (4).
The Gaussian distribution or error curve is the relationship which
often characterizes the distribution of observations about a mean
value
20. 1 refers to the sum of,
i.e. 1xi= xl + X2 + x3 + x4......................................... xn
21. The square of the sample standard deviation is the sample variance. In order
for this quantity to be an unbiased estimator of the population variance, o-2, we
need to alter the quantity in equation (1) slightly.
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The equation is given by
I - (x. A),
1fx 2= e 2or2
where / is the population mean. When x =,u, f(x) = 2= 2 and
when x = - oo or + oo, f~x) = 0. This is shown in figure 1.
f(x)
Il;
-3o- -2o- -10 0 I- 2- 3o
p.-3o- p. -2or p-o- p. p.+o" p.+2o IA+30.
Figure 1 - Gaussian Distribution Plot
of f(x) = e-
2o- 2o-2
showing deviations from the mean in terms of +lo, +2o-, and ±3o-
The area of the curve bound by x = g - o- to x = A + o-
corresponds to 68.3% of the total area and implies that the value of
the sample mean is between + o- with a probability of 0.68.
Similarly 95.4% of the distribution (area) lies within the limits x
= A. - 2o- to 1z + 2o- and 99.7% of the distribution lies within the
limit x = A - 3o" to x = A + 3o-.
The Breath and Blood Alcohol Relationship
The factor relating blood alcohol to breath alcohol level (2100) is an
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empirical factor determined experimentally by simultaneously
measuring the alcohol level in breath and blood many times and in
many individuals. The analysis of one such study (footnotes 14 and
15) is shown in Figure 2 where the (Breath alcohol - Blood
alcohol) is plotted against the frequency of occurrence for 253 tests
in which alcohol levels ranged from 0.000% to 0.22% (0 to 220
mg/100 ml). An analysis of the results shows that the breath alcohol
values are on the average 5 mg/100 ml lower than the blood alcohol
results. The standard deviation s, is 12.3 mgl100 ml (14).
Figure 2, as plotted by the authors, conforms with the standard
"Gaussian" configuration, thus enhancing confidence in the
accuracy of our interpretation of the results. A more rigorous
statistical treatment of the results is presented in the Appendix. The
calculated probabilities are not significantly different from the
simplified treatment which follows.
to-
-45 -4i) -j5 -30) -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 to 15 i) 25 3
BLOOD ALCOHOL BY BREATH ANALYSIS - BLOOD ALCOHOL BY DIRECT ANALYSIS
(MG ALCOHO/I 00 ML BLOOD)
Figure 2 - Plot of Frequency against (Blood alcohol by breath analysis - Blood
alcohol by direct analysis) in mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood in 253 tests.
The Criminal Code of Canada specifies 80 mg alcohol/ 100 ml
blood as the limit of sobriety.2 2 The essence of that particular
specified offence is that an accused possess a level of alcohol in his
blood stream in excess of 80 mg alcohol/ 100 ml blood (0.080%).
However, the breath alcohol instrument can only give blood alcohol
values with limited confidence based on the standard deviation and
probability consideration. For example, a driver who is assigned a
blood alcohol level of 105 mg/100 ml (0.100%) from breath tests
would be considered to have a reading23 of x + s or (105 - 12.3)
22. Supra, note 19
23. One might note that since o- is unknown the t distribution should be used in
setting these limits. However when N = 253,tt252) is very well approximated by a
standard normal variate.
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mg/100ml to (105 + 12.3) mg/100ml i.e. 92.7 to 117.3 m/100ml
100- 68.3 31.7
with 68.3% confidence or = = 15.8% probability
2 2
that his blood level is in fact lower than 92.7 mg/lOO ml.
Similarly for a higher confidence level the error limit must be
enlarged, i.e. for x ± 2s or (105 - 24.6) to (105 ± 24.6) i.e. for
80.4 to 129.6 mg/100 ml, the confidence level is 95.4%. Thus there
is a 2.3% probability that the blood level can be lower than 80.4
mg/100 ml. With an error allowance of 3s there is only 0.14%
probability that his blood level can be lower than 68.1 mg/ 100 ml.
24
Table 2 gives the percentage probability that a specific
measurement x is lower than x - no- where n has values of from 0.5
to 5.
Table 2
Proportion of the normal distribution curve lying below various












The foregoing data can lead to some interesting analysis. A
previous researcher delving into the field of statistics and legal
evidence concluded that it was seldom possible to apply an exact
probability term to the doctrine of reasonable doubt. 25 This is
perhaps a classic understatement. Referring back to Collins and the
Swedish parking cases, we believe it would be fair comment to state
24. A value of 5 mg/l100 ml alcohol is added to these values to correct for the fact
that the breath alcohol instrument gives lower values of blood levels.
25. H. Zeisel, Statistics as Legal Evidence (1960), International Encycolopedia of
Social Sciences Vol. 15, ed. D. L. Sills (MacMillan & Co., 1960) at 246-50
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that there the courts did not accept circumstances verging on
absolute certainty as sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the
breath alcohol statistical data. It should be obvious from both a legal
and mathematical point of view that by far the most contentious
issues arising in court proceedings based on breath alcohol evidence
are those involving drivers who have incurred readings within the
0.08% to 0.11% range. Engaging in a very rough computation, it is
readily observable that this particular segment of the evidentiary
spectrum is subject to a probability of innocence somewhere in the
neighbourhood of a few percent. (See Appendix) We believe that it
is fair comment to state categorically that there are literally
thousands of drivers convicted daily as being guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt in various jurisdictions around the world on the
basis of this type of evidence.
There are probably many readers at this juncture who will seize
upon our findings as proof positive that the legal profession can be
accused of worshipping false idols; that they have become object
slaves to some of the glittering machines spun off by our modem
technology. Here, the authors come out not necessarily on the side
of the angels, but on the side of Finkelstein and Fairley. With all
due respect to Professor Tribe, it should be recalled that the speed of
light is "measured" in a vacuum; this is not the case in measuring
the efficiency of a legal system. Lawyers and judges should not be
adverse to marshalling all weapons at their command in the aim of
furthering justice. Is not the objectivity of evidence produced by the
breath alcohol analyzer with all its inherent defects, preferable in
most respects to that of the subjectivity of an arresting police
officer? It is here that Professor Tribe contributes most greatly to
our collective wisdom, for, like Diogenes, he points out the pitfalls
of mere technological evidence. We should not, in all circum-
stances, remain convinced that an 99% probability equates to an
abiding conviction to a moral certainty. Yet our courts do appear to
remain so convinced. We can only advance several hypothetical
reasons for their so doing.
Firstly, the sheer magnitude of the numbers bandied about in
cases like Collins renders them automatically suspect. This is
unfortunate, as it leads to the impugning of the validity of all
statistical evidence. This path can only lead to the ultimate reductio
ad absurdum, where an accused would never be convicted on the
basis of statistical evidence. Score one for Finkelstein and Fairley.
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Secondly, the legal profession, like all other professions, is
subject to a certain amount of innate conservatism. Professionals
can become addicted to familiar jargon and to accomplishing tasks
in a repetitive manner. The breath alcohol analyzer has become an
established adjunct in criminal proceedings relating to drunken
driving; this enhances its credibility. Score one for Tribe.
Thirdly, there is a distinct possibility that judges and lawyers
have committed the very simple error of confusing probabilities
with possibilities. Philosophically, anything is possible, even the
most unlikely defence put forward by an accused, and this might
explain a court's reluctance to convict even in the most obvious of
cases. But let us suppose that the hypothetical reasonable man (who
just happened to be a Cockney) was placed in the position of the
judge trying the Swedish overtime parking case. The defence
lawyer explains that his client drove away, returned to the very
same parking spot, and his wheels just happened to come to rest in
exactly the same position as before. The Cockney's obvious
response would be: "Not very bloodly likely!" Score one for the
Cockney and score another for Finkelstein and Fairley.
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, it is possible to argue
that the probability demarcation line changes with the severity of the
crime. Even though we all pay lip service to the dogma of
reasonable doubt, justice dictates a gradually ascending scale for the
magnitude of the proof required. The results of a conviction for
drunken driving are not nearly as significant as those for a
conviction of murder. Score one for justice.
Our conclusion cannot be definitive. All that can be said with
absolute certainty is that reasonable doubt, insofar as our
investigations led us, lies somewhere between the parameters of
2.5o and 4o, i.e. between 0.7% and 0.0005%. But this should not
serve to refute the efficacy of the scientific method. To do so would
mean going even beyond the Holmesian concept of law; and we all
know this to be inconsistent with both logic and experience.
Appendix
If we were to suggest a possible procedure one is as follows. If
we apply linear regression techniques to Coldwell and Smith's data
(note 14 and 15), and model being
Y, =/go + fliXt + ei i = 1, -, 253
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with 3o and Pi being constants, xi - the it breathalyzer reading
and Y the it blood alcohol reading (e - N(0, o-2) and
independent) we find that the equation of the least squares line is
Y = 0.0027 + 1.027X (R2 = 0.884, Residual SS = 0.0001538)
Using the above least squares line and the underlying
assumptions we calculate:







where x is the percentage of blood in alcohol as determined by a
breath analysis and P is the probability of the actual blood level
being 0.08% or less. Thus the question of what constitutes
reasonable doubt can (in this instance) be put into a mathematical
context without questioning the applicability of the methods
involved.
